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“We’re making tools not colleagues,
and the great danger is not appreciating the difference,
which we should strive to accentuate,
marking and defending it with political and legal
innovations.
(…) We don’t need artificial conscious agents.
(…) We need intelligent tools.”2
Daniel C. Dennett
“We may hope that machines will eventually compete
with men in all purely intellectual fields.”3
Alan M. Turing
One major challenge of the 21st century to humankind is 
the widespread use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Hardly 
any day passes without news about the disruptive force of 
AI – both good and bad. Some warn that AI could be the 
worst event in the history of our civilization. Others stress 
the chances of AI diagnosing, for instance, cancer, or sup-
porting humans in the form of autonomous cars. But 
because AI is so disruptive the call for its regulation is 
wide-spread, including the call by some actors for interna-
tional treaties banning, for instance, socalled “killer 
robots”. Nevertheless, until now there is no consensus how 
and to which extent we should regulate AI. This paper exa-
mines whether we can identify key elements of responsible 
AI, spells out what exists as part “top down” regulation, 
and how new guidelines, such as the 2019 OECD Recom-
mendations on AI can be part of a solution to regultate AI 
systems. In the end, a solution shall be proposed that is 
coherent with international human rights to frame the 
challenges posed by AI that lie ahead of us without under-
mining science and innovation; reasons are given why and 
how a human rights based approach to responsible AI 
should inspire a new declaration at the international level.
Introduction
Everything about AI is a hype. It is labeled a disruptive 
technology. Its transformative force is compared to that 
of electricity. It is said that just as electricity transformed 
peoples’ lives and industries 100 years ago, AI will now 
transform our lives.4 As we are incorporating AI systems 
into our life, we benefit from the efficiencies that come 
from AI systems (AIs).5
However, a technology like AI is, first of all, a tool. I 
argue, as the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett argues, that 
AIs are tools and should be regarded and treated as tools. 
They are tools with a specific quality and power, because 
AI systems can be used for multiple purposes, and will 
imitate and replace human beings in many intelligent ac-
tivities, shape human behavior and even change us as hu-
man beings in the process6 in intended and unintended 
ways.7 But even if AIs could be in principle as autono-
mous as a person they lack our vulnerability and 
mortality.8
This means that as long as we develop, sell and use AI, 
we can and have to decide how we frame the rules and 
norms governing AI. As always when we have the chan-
ce to get a new, powerful technological tool, we have to 
answer the question how we can make sure that we as a 
society will make the right choices – or at least minimize 
the risk that we will make the wrong choices; and how do 
we decide what is right and wrong – especially as the 
field of AI is an area hardly anybody understands fully. I 
argue that these are questions that cannot be answered 
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by individuals, corporations or States, only, but have to 
be answered by the international community as a whole, 
as well, because AI research, development and deploy-
ment, and the related effects are not limited to the terri-
tory of a State but are transnational and global.
This paper is a starting point to discuss key elements 
of responsible AI. Although the notion of intelligence in 
Artificial Intelligence might suggest otherwise, AI as a 
technology is not per se “good”, neither is it “bad”. The 
first part spells out features of AI systems, and identifies 
benefits and risks developing and using AI systems, in 
order to show challenges for regulating these tools (see 
below I).
The international governance dimension is stressed 
in the second part. There I will look closer at the Recom-
mendations on Artificial Intelligence by the Organisati-
on for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) that were adopted in 2019 (see below II).9 These 
are the first universal international soft law rules that try 
to govern and frame AI in a general way. 
Thirdly, I argue that we should stress the link between 
human rights and the regulation of AI systems, and 
highlight the advantages of an approach in regulating AI 
that is based on legally binding human rights that are 
part of the existing international legal order (see below 
III).
I. AI Systems as Multipurpose Tools – Challenges for 
Regulation
1. Notions and Foundations
When we try to understand what AI means as a techno-
logy, we realize that there seem to be many aspects and 
applications relevant and linked to AI systems: from faci-
al recognition systems, to predictive policing, from AI 
called AlphaGo playing the game GO, to social bots and 
algorithmic traders, from autonomous cars to – maybe 
even – autonomous weapons.
A first question we should answer is: How can we ex-
plain AI to someone who does not know what AI is, but 
wants to join and should join the discourse on regulation 
and governance? A simple start would be to claim, that a 
key feature of the field of AI is the goal to build intelli-
gent entities.10 An AI system could be defined as a sys-
tem that is intelligent, i.e. rational, in the way and to the 
extent that it does the “right thing”, given what it knows.11 
However this is only one definition of an AI system. The 
standard textbook quotes eight definitions by different 
authors laid out along two dimensions including two as-
pects to measure the success of an AI system in relation 
to human performance (“thinking humanly”; ”acting hu-
manly”); and two aspects to measure the success of an AI 
system in relation to ideal performance (“thinking ratio-
nally”; “acting rationally”).12 But even if those are correct 
who state that AI is concerned with rational or intelligent 
behavior in artifacts, the underlying question is whether 
it is correct to state that the notion of “intelligence” me-
ans the same as the notion of “rationality”.13 It seems re-
asonable to claim that AI systems exhibit forms of intel-
ligence that are qualitatively different to those seen in 
humans or animals as biological agents.14
As a basic description one might state that AI tools 
are based on complex or simple algorithms15 used to 
make decisions, and are created to solve particular tasks. 
Autonomous cars, for instance, must drive (in a given 
time without causing accidents or violating laws) to a 
certain place, and game-playing AI systems should chal-
lenge or even win against a human being.16
As AI is expected to fulfill a certain task, there are re-
quired preconditions for a system to be able to “do the 
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right thing”. Depending on the areas of use, AI key capa-
bilities are natural language processing (speech recogni-
tion), reasoning, (learning, perception, and action (ro-
botics). Especially learning17 is a key ability of modern 
AI systems, 18 as for some problems it is unclear how to 
transform the input to the output.19 This means that al-
gorithms are developed that enable the machine to ext-
ract functions from a dataset to fulfill a certain task.20 
The socalled deep learning, the field of machine learning 
that focuses on deep neural networks,21 is the central 
part of current AI systems if large datasets are available, 
as for face recognition on digital cameras22 or in the field 
of medicine to diagnose certain illnesses.23 Deep lear-
ning mechanisms that are able to improve themselves 
without human interaction and without rule-based pro-
gramming already exist today.24 As John Kelleher puts it: 
“Deep learning enables data-driven decisions by iden-
tifying and extracting patterns from large datasets”.25 It is 
not astonishing that since 2012 the number of new deep 
learning AI algorithms has grown exponential26 but as 
the functional processes that generate the output are not 
clear (or at least hard to interpret) the problem of the 
complexity and opacity of algorithms that seem to be 
“black boxes” is obvious as well.27
2. Risks and Chances
The “black boxes” problem shows that it is important, if 
we think about AI regulation or governance, to look at 
the different risks and chances that can be linked to the 
development and use of AI systems. Questions of con-
cern that are raised are related to our democratic order 
(news ranking algorithms, “algorithmic justice”), kine-
tics (autonomous cars and autonomous weapons), our 
economy and markets (algorithmic trading and pricing), 
and our society (conversational robots). A major and 
inherent risk if a system learns from data is that bias in 
AI systems can hardly be avoided. At least if AI learns 
from human-generated (text) data, they can or even will 
include health, gender or racial stereotypes.28 Some 
claim, however, that there are better ways for reducing 
bias in AI than for reducing bias in humans, so AI sys-
tems may be or become less biased than humans.29 Besi-
des, there are risks of misuse, if AI systems are used to 
commit crimes, as for instance fraud.30
Another risk is that AI technologies have the potenti-
al for greater concentration of power. Those who are able 
to use this technology can become more powerful (cor-
porations or governments),31 and can influence large 
numbers of people (for instance to vote in a certain way). 
It was Norbert Wiener who wrote in 1954
“(…) that such machines, though helpless by themsel-
ves, may be used by a human being or a block of human 
beings to increase their control over the rest of the race 
or that political leaders may attempt to control their po-
pulations by means not of machines themselves but 
through political techniques as narrow and indifferent to 
human possibility as if they had , in fact, been conceived 
mechanically.”32
If we think about regulation, we must not forget the 
unintended and unanticipated negative and/or positive 
consequences of AI systems and that there might be a se-
vere lack of predictability of these consequences.33 The 
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use of AI will provide new and even better ways to im-
prove our health system, to protect our environment and 
to allocate resources34 However, plausible risk scenarios 
may show that the fear of the potential loss of human 
oversight is not per se irrational.35 They support the call 
for a “human in the loop”, that – for instance – a judge 
decides about the fate of a person, not an AI system, and 
a combatant decides about lethal or non-lethal force du-
ring an armed conflict, not an autonomous weapon. But 
to keep us as persons “in the loop” means that we need 
state based regulation stressing this as a necessary pre-
condition at least in the areas where there are serious 
risks for the violation of human rights or human dignity. 
I agree with those who claim, that it is important to un-
derstand the properties of AI systems if we think about 
AI regulation and governance and that there is the need 
to look at the behavior of “black box” algorithms, similar 
to the behavior of animals, in real world settings.36 My 
hypothesis is, that an AI system that serves human beings 
has to meet the “at least as good as a human being / hu-
man expert”37 threshold. This sets even a higher 
threshold as the one that is part of the idea of “beneficial 
machines”, defined as intelligent machines whose actions 
can be expected to achieve our objectives rather than 
their objectives.38
We also have to keep in mind the future development 
of AI systems and their interlinkage. I have spelled out so 
far features of so-called narrow AI or weak AI. Weak AI 
possesses specialized, domain specific, intelligence.39 In 
contrast, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) will pos-
sess general intelligence and strong AI could mean, as 
some claim, that AI systems “are actually thinking”.40 
Whether there is a chance that AGI, and human-level or 
superhuman AI (the Singularity)41 will be possible 
within our lifetime is uncertain.42 It is not per se implau-
sible to argue, as some scientists do, that intelligence ex-
plosion leads to a dynamically unstable system as smar-
ter systems will have an easier time making themselves 
smarter43 and that there will be a point beyond which it 
is impossible for us to make reliable predictions.44 And it 
seems convincing that if superintelligent AI was possible 
it would be a significant risk for humanity.45
3. Current and Future AI Regulation
a. Bases
For regulative issues, the differentiation of narrow AI 
versus AGI might be helpful as a starting point. It is more 
convincing, however, to find categories that show the 
possible (negative) impact of AI systems to core human 
rights, human dignity and to constitutional rights, such 
as protection against discrimination, the right to life, the 
right to health, the right to privacy, and the right to take 
part in elections, etc.46 From this perspective, even deve-
lopments such as a fast take-off scenario, which means 
that an AGI system becomes super-intelligent because of 
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a recursive self-improvement cycle,47 that are difficult to 
predict, must not be neglected as we can think about 
how to frame low probability high impact scenarios in a 
proportional way.48
b. Sector-Specific Rules and Multilevel Regulation
When speaking about governance and regulation, it is 
important to differentiate between rules that are legally 
binding on the one hand and non-binding soft law, on 
the other hand. In the area of international, European 
Union, and national law, we see that at least parts of AI-
driven technology are covered by existing sector-specific 
rules.
(1) AI Systems Driven by (Big) Data
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)49 aims 
to protect personal data50 of natural persons (art. 1 (1) 
GDPR) and applies to the processing of this data even by 
wholly automated means (art. 2 (1) GDPR).51 The GDPR 
requires an informed consent52 of the consumer if some-
body wants to use his or her data. It can be seen as sec-
tor-specific law governing AI systems as AI systems often 
make use of large amounts of personal data. The general 
principles that are laid down for – inter alia – the proces-
sing of personal data (including lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency53) and the collection of personal data (pur-
pose limitation) in art. 5 GDPR are applicable with 
regard to AI systems,54 and have to be implemented via 
appropriate technical and organizational measures by 
the controller (art. 25 GDPR).55 According to art. 22 
GDPR we, as data subjects, have the right “not to be sub-
ject to a decision based solely on automated processing” 
that produces legal effects concerning the data subject or 
similarly affects him or her.56 Substantive legitimacy of 
this regulations is given because the GDPR is in cohe-
rence with the human rights that bind EU organs and 
can be reviewed and implemented by the European 
Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court,57 
especially art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (EUChHR)58 that lays down the 
protection of personal data.59 Like every regulation and 
law, the GDPR has lacunae, and there might be relevant 
lacunae in the area of AI-driven technology, as for 
instance, with regard to brain data that is used for consu-
mer technology.60 The decisive question is whether all 
relevant aspects of brain data protection are already 
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one area of research of the Sal-tus-FRIAS Responsible AI Research 
Group the author is part of.
62  Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 05.04.2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 
2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and regulation (EC) 
No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 
93/42/EEC, OJEU L117/1, 05.05.2017. It came into force May 
2017, but medical devices will have a transition time of three years 
(until May 2020) to meet the new requirements.
63  Art. 2 MDR. „ (…) ‘medical device’ means any instrument, ap-
paratus, appliance, software, im-plant, reagent, material or other 
article intended by the manufacturer to be used, alone or in com-
bination, for human beings for one or more of the following speci-
fic medical purposes: (…)”. For exemptions see, however, art. 1 (6) 
MDR.
64  Cf. art. 54, 55, art. 106 (3), Annex IX Section 5.1, Annex X Section 
6 MDR.
65  Cf. the Pharmaceutical legislation for medicinal products of hu-
man use, Vol. 1, including different Directives and Regulations, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/eudralex/vol-
1_de.
66  §§ 21 et seq. Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln (Arznei-
mittelgesetz, AMG), BGBl. I, 1626; Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16.04.2014 on 
clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, OJEU L 158/1, 
27.05.2014.
67  Art. 1 Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des Straßenverkehrsgesetzes 
(8. StVGÄndG), 16.06.2017, BGBl. I 1648.
68  Ethik-Kommission „Automatisiertes und vernetztes Fahren“ des 
Bundesministeriums für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, Re-
port June 2017, available at: https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/
DE/Publikationen/DG/bericht-der-ethik-kommission.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile.
69  § 1a (1) StVG: „Der Betrieb eines Kraftfahrzeugs mittels hoch- und 
vollautomatisierter Fahrfunktion ist zulässig, wenn die Funktion 
bestimmungsgemäß verwendet wird.”
70  This seems true even if the description of the intended purpose 
and the level of automation shall be „unambigous“ according to 
rationale of the law maker, cf. BT-Drucks., 18/11300, 20: “Die Sys-
tembeschreibung des Fahrzeugs muss über die Art der Ausstat-
tung mit automatisierter Fahrfunktion und über den Grad der 
Automatisierung unmissverständlich Auskunft geben, um den 
Fahrer über den Rahmen der bestimmungsgemäßen Verwendung 
zu informieren.“
71  Bernd Grzeszick, art. 20, in Roman Herzog/Rupert Scholz/Matthi-
as Herdegen/Hans Klein (eds.), Maunz/Dürig Grundgesetz-Kom-
mentar, para. 51–57.
72  Agreement Concerning the Adoption of Harmonized Technical 
United Nations Regulations for Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and 
Parts which can be Fitted and/or be Used on Wheeled Vehicles and 
the Conditions for Reciprocal Recognition of Approvals Granted 
on the Basis of these United Nations Regulations.
covered by the protection of health data (art. 4 (15) 
GDPR) or biometric data (art. 4 (14) GDPR) that are 
defined in the regulation.61
(2) AI Systems as Medical Devices
Besides, there is EU Regulation on Medical Devices 
(MDR),62 which governs certain AI-driven apps in the 
health sector and other AI-driven medical devices, for 
instance, in the area of neurotechnology.63 And again, 
one has to ask whether this regulation is sufficient to pro-
tect the human dignity, life and health of consumers, as 
the impact on human dignity, life and health might be 
more fareaching than the usual products that were envi-
saged by the drafters of the regulation. Although the new 
EU medical device regulation was adopted in 2017, it 
includes a so-called scrutiny process64 for high-risk pro-
ducts (certain class III devices), which is a consultation 
procedure prior to market approval. It is not a preventive 
permit procedure, differing from the permit procedure 
necessary for the market approval of new medicine (me-
dicinal products), as there is a detailed regulation at the 
national and even more at the European Union level,65 
including a new Clinical Trial Regulation.66 That the pre-
ventive procedures differ whether the object of the rele-
vant laws is a “medical device” or a “medicinal product” 
is not convincing, if the risks involved for human health 
for a consumer are the same when comparing new drugs 
and certain new medical devices, as – for instance – new 
neurotechnology.
(3) AI Systems as (Semi-)Autonomous Cars
Sector-specific (top-down) regulation is already in force 
when it comes to the use of (semi-)autonomous cars. In 
Germany, the relevant national law was amended in 
2017,67 before the competent federal ethic commission 
published its report,68 in order to include new highly or 
fully automated systems (§ 1a, § 1b and § 63 StVG). § 1a 
(1) StVG states that the operation of a car by means of a 
highly or fully automated driving function is permissib-
le, provided the function is used for its intended purpo-
se.69 However, what “intended purpose” means must be 
defined by the automotive company. Therefore § 1a (1) 
StVG means a dynamic reference to the private stan-
dard-setting by a corporation that seems to be rather 
vague70 especially if you think about the rule of law and 
the principle of “Rechtsklarheit”, which means that legal 
rules have to be clear and understandable.71 It is even 
true with regard to the applicable international treaties 
that sector-specific law can be amended and changed 
(even at the international level) if it is necessary to adapt 
the old rules to now AI-driven systems. The UN/ECE 
1958 Agreement72 was amended in 2017 and 2018 (the 
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73  Addendum 78: UN Regulation No. 79 Rev. 3, ECE/TRANS/
WP.29/2016/57 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2017/10 (as amended by pa-
ragraph 70 of the report ECE/TRANS/WP.29/1129), 30.11.2017, 
“Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with re-
gard to steering equipment”:
 “2.3.4.1. ‘Automatically commanded steering function (ACSF)’ 
means a function within an electronic control system where actua-
tion of the steering system can result from automatic evaluation of 
signals initiated on-board the vehicle, possibly in conjunction with 
passive infrastructure features, to generate control action in order 
to assist the driver.
 2.3.4.1.1. ‘ACSF of Category A’ means a function that operates at a 
speed no greater than 10 km/h to assist the driver, on demand, in 
low speed or parking manoeuvring.
 2.3.4.1.2. ‘ACSF of Category B1’ means a function which assists the 
driver in keeping the vehicle within the chosen lane, by influencing 
the lateral movement of the vehicle.
 2.3.4.1.3. ‘ACSF of Category B2’ means a function which is initi-
ated/activated by the driver and which keeps the vehicle within 
its lane by influencing the lateral movement of the vehicle for ex-
tended periods without further driver command/confirmation.
 2.3.4.1.4. ‘ACSF of Category C’ means, a function which is initia-
ted/activated by the driver and which can perform a single lateral 
manoeuvre (e.g. lane change) when commanded by the driver.
 2.3.4.1.5. ‘ACSF of Category D’ means a function which is initia-
ted/activated by the driver and which can indicate the possibility 
of a single lateral manoeuvre (e.g. lane change) but performs that 
function only following a confirmation by the driver.
 2.3.4.1.6. ‘ACSF of Category E’ means a function which is initiated/
activated by the driver and which can continuously determine the 
possibility of a manoeuvre (e.g. lane change) and complete these 
manoeuvres for extended periods without further driver com-
mand/confirmation.”
74  Addendum 12-H: UN Regulation No. 13-H, ECE/TRANS/
WP.29/2014/46/Rev.1 and ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2016/50, 
05.06.2018, “Uniform provisions concerning the approval of pas-
senger cars with regard to braking”: 2.20. “‘Automatically com-
manded braking’ means a function within a complex electronic 
control system where actuation of the braking system(s) or brakes 
of certain axles is made for the purpose of generating vehicle retar-
dation with or without a direct action of the driver, resulting from 
the automatic evaluation of on-board initiated information.”
75  To understand the relevance of these regulations in a multi-level 
regulation system one has to take into account that other inter-
national, European national provisions refer directly or indirectly 
to the UN/ECE Regulations, cf. e.g. art. 8 (5bis) and art. 39 of the 
Vienna Convention on Road Traf-fic; art. 21 (1), 29 (3), 35 (2) of 
the European Directive 2007/46/EC (“Framework Directive”); § 1a 
(3) StVG.
76  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Cer-
tain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Ex-
cessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), 
Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in 
the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Geneva, 25.–
29.03.2019 and 20.–21.08.2019, Report of the 2019 session, CCW/
GGW.1/2019/3, 25.09.2019, available at: https://undocs.org/en/
CCW/GGE.1/2019/3.
77  Ibid., Annex IV, 13 et seq.
78  Ibid., Annex IV: (b) “Human responsibility for decisions on the 
use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability can-
not be transferred to machines. This should be considered across 
the entire life cycle of the weapons system; (…)
 (d) Accountability for developing, deploying and using any emer-
ging weapons system in the framework of the CCW must be en-
sured in accordance with applicable international law, includ-ing 
through the operation of such systems within a responsible chain 
of human command and control;”.
79  For this view and a definition see working paper (WP) submitted 
by the Russian Federation, CCW/GGE.1/2019/WP.1, 15.03.2019, 
para. 5: “unmanned technical means other than ordnance that are 
intended for carrying out combat and support missions without 
any involvement of the operator“, expressly excluding unmanned 
aerial vehicles as highly automated systems.
UN Regulations No. 7973 and No. 13-H74) to have a legal
basis for the use of (semi-)autonomous cars.75
The examples mentioned above show that detailed, 
legally binding laws and regulations are already in force 
to regulate AI systems at the international, European, 
and national level. According to this, the “narrative” is 
not correct which includes the claim that (top-down) 
state-based regulation lags (or: must lag) behind the 
technical development, especially in the area of a fast-
moving disruptive technology as AI. It seems rather con-
vincing to argue instead that whether there is meaning-
ful regulation in the field of AI depends on the political 
will to regulate AI systems at the national, European, and 
international level.
(4) AI Systems as (Semi-)Autonomous Weapons
The political will to regulate will depend on the interest(s) 
and preferences of states, especially with regard to eco-
nomic goals and security issues as in most societies 
(democratic or undemocratic) there seems broad con-
sensus that economic growth of the national economy is 
a (primary) aim and providing national security is the 
most important legitimate goal of a state. This might 
explain why there are at the international level – at least 
until now – areas where there is no consensus to regula-
te AI systems as a regulation is seen as a limiting force for 
economic growth and/or national security.
This is obvious with regard to (semi-)autonomous 
weapons. Though a Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) was established 
in 2016 and has met in Geneva since 2017 convened 
through the Conference on Certain Conventional Wea-
pons (CCW) and a report of the 2019 session of the GGE 
is published76 there are only guiding principles affirmed 
by the Group.77 These guiding principles stress, inter 
alia, the need for accountability (lit. b and d),78 and risk 
assessment measures as part of the design (lit. g). Howe-
ver, there is no agreement on a meaningful international 
treaty, and it is still disputed whether the discussion 
within the GGE should be limited to fully autonomous 
systems.79
The mostly state-driven discussions at the CCW have 
shown that some States are arguing for a prohibition as 
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80  WP submitted by the Russian Federation, CCW/GGE.1/2019/
WP.1; para. 2: “The Russian Federation presumes that potential 
LAWS can be more efficient than a human operator in addressing 
the tasks my minimizing the error rate. (…).”
81  WP submitted by the USA, CCW/GGE.1/2019/WP.5, 28.03.2019, 
para. 2 lit. c: “Emerging technologies in the area of LAWS could 
strengthen the implementation of IHL, by, inter alia, reducing the 
risk of civilian casualties, facilitating the investigation or reporting 
of incidents involving potential violations, enhancing the ability to 
implement corrective actions, and automatically generating infor-
mation on unexploded ordnance.”; cf. as well ibid., para. 15.
82  WP submitted by the Russian Federation, CCW/GGE.1/2019/
WP.1, para. 10: “The Russian Federation is convinced that the is-
sue of LAWS is extremely sensitive. While discussing it, the GGE 
should not ignore potential benefits of such systems in the context 
of ensuring States‘ national security. (…)”.
83  WP submitted by France, CCW/GGe.2/2018/WP.3, stressing inter 
alia the principles of command responsibility, ibid. para. 6, stres-
sing a “central role for human command in the use of force” (pa-
ra. 12): “(…) In this regard, the command must retain the ability 
to take final decisions regarding the use of lethal force including 
within the framework of using systems with levels of autonomy or 
with various artificial intelligence components.”
84  Even the German Datenethikkommission stresses that there is not 
per se a “red line” with regard to autonomous weapons as long as 
the killing of human beings it not determined by an AI system, 
Gutachten der Datenethikkommission, 2019, 180.
85  WP submitted by the Russian Federation, CCW/GGE.1/2019/
WP.1, para. 7. For a different approach see the ICRC Working Pa-
per on Autonomy, AI and Robotics: Technical Aspects of Hu-man 
Control, CCW/GGE.1/2019/WP.7, 20.08.2019.
86  16.12.1971, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, entered into force 26.03.1975. The 
BWC allows research on biological agents for preventive, protecti-
ve or other peaceful purposes; however this treaty does not provi-
de sufficient protection against the risks of misuse of research be-
cause research conducted for peaceful purposes is neither limited 
nor prohibited.
87  29.01.2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, entered into force 11.09.2003.
88  The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability 
and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 15.10.2010, 
entered into force 05.03.2018.
89  The term “international soft law” is understood in this paper to 
cover rules that cannot be attributed to a formal legal source of 
public international law and that are, hence, not directly legally 
binding but have been agreed upon by subjects of international 
law (i.e. States, international organizations) that could, in prin-
ciple, establish international hard law; for a similar definition see 
Daniel Thürer, Soft Law, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012, Vol. 9, 271, para. 
8. The notion does not include private rule making by corpora-
tions (including codes of conduct) or mere recommendations by 
stakeholders, non-governmental organisations and other private 
entities.
90  See above note 9.
91  Cf. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LE-
GAL-0449.
part of a new international treaty, like Austria, yet other 
States, like Russia80 and the US,81 are stressing the advan-
tages82 of the development and use of (semi-)autono-
mous weapons. Germany and France83 do not support 
an international treaty but opted for a soft law code of 
conduct with regard to framing the use of those 
weapons.84
Besides, key elements of a governance regime of 
(semi-)autonomous weapons are unclear. What is meant 
by “human control over the operation of such systems” is 
discussed even if it is stated that this is an important li-
miting factor by a state. Russia, for instance, argues that
“the control system of LAWS should provide for inter-
vention by a human operator or the upper-level control 
system to change the mode of operation of such systems, 
including partial or complete deactivation”.85
With this, Russia eliminates meaningful human con-
trol as a necessary precondition to use (semi-)autono-
mous weapons. The “human in the loop” as a last resort 
of using lethal weapons and the subject of responsibility 
– with the last resort to convict somebody as a war crimi-
nal – is replaced by the upper-level control system that 
might be another AI system.
(5) First Conclusion
The examples mentioned above show the loopholes of 
the international regulation of AI systems, although the-
re are specific rules in place in some areas, mostly at the 
European level. But more importantly that there is no 
coherent, general, or universal international regulation 
of AI as part of the international hard law. Although the-
re are lacunae in other areas as well (thus far no interna-
tional treaty on existential and global catastrophic risks 
and scientific research exists) this widespread internatio-
nal non-regulation of AI research and development is 
different from other fields of fast moving technological 
progress: biotechnology. In the field of biotechnology 
there are a treaties, like the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion (BWC),86 the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,87 and the Kuala 
Lumpur Liability Protocol88 that are applicable in order 
to prohibit research that is not aimed at peaceful purpo-
ses or to dimisih risks related to the genetic modification 
of living organisms. Therefore, it is important to look 
closer to the first attempt to adopt general AI principles 
at the international level as part of the international soft 
law.89
II. OECD AI Recommendations as International Soft 
Law
1. Basis and Content
The OECD issued recommendations on AI in 201990 and 
43 States have adopted these principles91 including rele-
vant actors in the field of AI as the US, South Korea, 
Japan, UK, France, and Germany, and States that are not 
members of the OECD. The recommendations were 
drafted with the help of an expert group (AIGO) that 
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92  Germany did send one member (Policy Law: Digital Work and So-
ciety, Federal Ministry for La-bour and Social Affairs), Japan two, 
as well as France, and the European Commission; South Korea did 
send three members, as the USA (US Department of State, US De-
partment of Commerce; US National science Foundation).
93  Cf. https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/oecd-aigo-member-
ship-list.pdf.
94  Cf. OECD Website: What are the OECD Principles on AI?, https://
www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/.
95  These are: 1. Human agency and oversight; 2. Technical robust-
ness and safety 3. Privacy and data governance; 4. Transparency; 
5. Diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; 6. Societal and envi-
ronmental well-being 7. Accountability.
96  An AI system is defined as “a machine-based system that can, for 
a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, re-
commendations, or decisions influencing real or virtual environ-
ments. AI systems are designed to operate with varying levels of 
autonomy.” Cf. I OECD AI Recommendations.
97  Ibid., I OECD AI Recommendations.
98  See above at note 28. See as well Gutachten der Datenethikkom-
mission, 2019, 194.
99  Silja Vöneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik, 2010, 284 et seq.
100  See above at note 93.
consists of 50 members from – as the OECD writes – 
governments,92 academia, business, civil society etc., 
including IBM, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Deep-
Mind, as well as invited experts from MIT.93 The OECD 
claims that these Principles will be a global reference 
point for trustworthy AI.94 It refers to the notion of trust-
worthy AI, as did the High-level Expert Group on AI (AI 
HLEG) set up by the EU, which published Ethics Guide-
lines on AI in April 2019 listing seven key requirements 
that AI systems shall meet to be trustworthy.95
The OECD recommendations state and spell out five 
complementary value-based “principles for responsible 
stewardship of trustworthy AI” (section1):96 these are in-
clusive growth, sustainable development and well-being 
(1.1); human-centered values and fairness (1.2.); trans-
parency and explainability (1.3.); robustness, security 
and safety (1.4.); and accountability (1.5.). In addition, AI 
actors – meaning those who play an active role in the AI 
system lifecycle, including organizations and individuals 
that deploy or operate AI97 – should respect the rule for 
human rights and democratic values (1.2. lit. a). These in-
clude freedom, dignity and autonomy, privacy and data 
protection, non-discrimination and equality, diversity, 
fairness, social justice, and internationally recognized la-
bor rights. But the wording of the principles is very soft. 
For instance, AI actors should implement
“mechanisms and safeguards, such as capacity for human 
determination, that are appropriate to the context and 
consistent with the state of the art” (1.2. lit. b).
The recommendation about transparency and explai-
nability (1.3.) has only slightly more substance. It states 
that AI actors
“[…] should provide meaningful information, appro-
priate to the context, and consistent with the state of art 
[…] (iv.) to enable those adversely affected by an AI system 
to challenge its outcome based on plain and easy-to-un-
derstand information on the factors, and the logic that ser-
ved as the basis for the prediction, rec-ommendation or 
decision.”
Additionally, it states that
“AI actors should, based on their roles, the context, and 
their ability to act, apply a systematic risk management 
approach to each phase of the AI system lifecycle, on a con-
tinuous basis to address risks related to AI systems, inclu-
ding privacy, digital security, safety and bias.” (1.4 lit. c).
If we think that discrimination and unjustified biases 
are one of the key problems of AI,98 asking for a risk ma-
nagement approach to avoid these problems does not 
seem to be sufficient as a standard of AI actor (corpora-
tion) due diligence.
And the wording with regard to accountability is soft 
as well (1.5):
“AI actors should be accountable for the proper functio-
ning of AI systems and for the respect of the above princip-
les, based on their roles, the context and consistent with the 
state for the art.” 
This does not mean and does not mention any legal lia-
bility or legal responsibility.”
2. (Dis-)Advantages and Legitimacy
The OECD recommendations show some of the advan-
tages and disadvantages that we see in the area of inter-
national soft law. The advantages are that they can be 
drafted in a short period of time (the working group 
started in 2018); that they can include experts from the 
relevant fields and state officials; that they can spell out 
and identify an existing overlapping consensus of mem-
ber states, here the OECD member states; and that they 
might develop some kind of normative force even if they 
are not legally binding as an international treaty.99
However, the disadvantages of the OECD recommen-
dations are obvious as well. Firstly, the basis for the pro-
cedural legitimacy is unclear as to which experts are allo-
wed to participate is not entirely clear. In the field of AI, 
experts are employed, paid, or closely linked to AI cor-
porations100 hence, the advice they give is not (entirely) 
independent. If an International Organisation (IO) or 
State one wants to enhance procedural legitimacy for AI 
recommendations, one should rely on different groups: 
one of the independent experts with no (financial) links 
to corporations, one of the experts working for corpora-
tions, and a third group consisting of civil society and 
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101  See below Part III.
102  The arguments at part III. 1.-3. were published in my paper Hu-
man Rights and Legitimate Governance of Existential and Global 
Catastrophic Risks, in Silja Voeneky/Gerald Neuman (eds.), Hu-
man Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in Times of Disorder, 
2018, 149.
103  For the basis on the concept and notion of “legitimacy”, see Silja 
Voeneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik, 2010, 130–162. For discussion 
of the legitimacy of international law, see Allen Buchanan, The Le-
gitimacy of International Law, in Samantha Besson/John Tasioulas 
(eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, 2010, 79–96; John 
Tasioulas, Legitimacy of International Law, in Samantha Besson/
John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, 2010, 
at 97–116.
104  A deontological theory of ethics is one which holds that at least 
some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences, 
see Robert G. Olson, in Paul Edward (ed.), The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 1967, 1–2, 343.
105  Which means that these views maintain that “it is sometimes 
wrong to do what produces the best available outcome overall” as 
these views incorporate “agent-centred restrictions,” see Samuel 
Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, 1994, 2.
106  On “direct” and “act” utilitarianism, see Richard B. Brandt, Facts, 
Values, and Morality, 1996, 142; for the notion of act-consequen-
tialism and classical utilitarianism see Samuel Scheffler, supra note 
105, at 2-3; for an overview see John C. Smart, Utilitarianism, in 
Paul Edward (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1967, 7–8, 
206. 
NGO members. States or IO could then compare the re-
commendations, discuss the differences, and choose or 
combine the one most convincing.
Secondly, we have to discuss the substantive legitima-
cy because the OECD recommendations do not stress 
the responsibility of governments to protect human 
rights in the area of AI. They include only five recom-
mendations to policymakers (“adherents”, section 2) that 
shall be implemented in national policies and internatio-
nal cooperation consistent with the principles menti-
oned above. These include investing in AI research and 
development (2.1), fostering a digital ecosystem for AI 
(2.2), shaping an enabling policy environment for AI 
(2.3), building human capacity and preparing for labor 
market transformation (2.4), and international coop-
eration for trustworthy AI (2.5).
3. Second Conclusion
As a conclusion of this second part one could state that 
the OECD recommendations lower the threshold too far 
and shift the focus too far away from States as main 
actors of the international community and as those obli-
ged to protect human rights101 towards private actors. 
This is a major disadvantage because although these 
recommendations exist, it is still unclear what state obli-
gations can be deduced from legally binding human 
rights – including the relevant human rights treaties and 
rules of customary law – with regard to the governance 
of AI. Besides, the recommendations that address priva-
te actors and their responsibilities are drafted in a lan-
guage that is too soft and vague. As a result, I argue that 
the OECD Recommendations could and should have 
been more meaningful with regard to standards of due 
diligence and responsibility in the age of AI for private 
actors and – even more – with regard to state duties to 
protect human rights. The latter aspect might even lead 
to a trend to undermine state duties to protect human 
rights in times of AI – and this could undermine the 
relevance of human rights regarding AI regulation as a 
whole.
III. Legitimacy, Human Rights and AI Regulation
The question to be answered in this third part is: why are 
human rights decisive with regard to the regulation of 
AI, and how can we defend the link between legitimacy 
and human rights in the field of AI regulation?
1. Legitimacy 
I start with the notion of legitimacy. As I have written 
before, legitimacy should be viewed primarily as a nor-
mative, not a descriptive, concept: 102 It refers to stan-
dards of justification of governance, regulation and obli-
gations. Hence, legitimate governance or regulation 
means that the guiding norms and standards have to be 
justifiable in a supra-legal way (i.e. they possess rational 
acceptability). If we think about international regulation, 
it seems fruitful to link the notion of “legitimate regula-
tion” to the existing legal order of public international 
law. Without saying that legality is sufficient for legitima-
cy, I argue that guiding norms and standards have to be 
coherent with existing international law insofar as the 
international law reflects moral (i.e. justified) values.103
2. Ethical Paradigms
We have to state that there are different ethical para-
digms that can justify regulation in the field of AI in a 
supra legal way. One is the human rights-based approach 
that can be considered a deontological concept,104 as the 
rightness or wrongness of conduct is derived from the 
character of the behavior itself.105 Another approach is 
utilitarianism, which can be described as the doctrine 
which states that “one should perform that act, among 
those that on the evidence are available to one, that will 
most probably maximise benefits”.106 It seems important 
to note that the different normative ethical theories are 
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based on reasonable grounds (i.e. they possess rational 
acceptability),107 and one cannot decide whether there is 
a theory that clearly trumps the others. Therefore, in loo-
king for standards that are the bases of legitimate regula-
tion of AI systems, it is not fruitful to decide whether one 
normative ethical theory is in general terms the most 
convincing one, but rather which ethical paradigm 
seems to be the most convincing in regard to the specific 
questions that we have to deal with when framing AI sys-
tems. 
3. Human Rights-based AI Regulation 
As I have argued before with regard to the regulation of 
existential risks, 108 I argue that AI regulation and gover-
nance should be based on human rights, more precisely 
on legally binding human rights. Other ethical approa-
ches shall not be ruled out as far as they are compatible 
with human rights. But I reject views that argue that uti-
litarian standards should be the primary standard to 
measure the legitimacy of an AI regulative regime.109 
The arguments supporting this claim are the following:
To regulate AI is a global challenge. Hence, it would be a 
major deficit not to rely on human rights. They are part 
of existing international law. They are not only rooted in 
the moral discourse as universal values, but they also 
bind many, or even all States (as treaty law or customary 
law), and they can be implemented by courts or other 
institutional means, laid down in human right treaties, 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)110 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). The latter is a universal human 
rights treaty that is binding on more than 170 States Par-
ties,111 including major AI relevant actors, like the USA.
What seems to be even more important is that when 
we turn to a human rights framework, we see that inter-
national legal human rights make it possible to spell out 
the decisive values that must be taken into account for 
assessing different AI-research, -development and -de-
ployment scenarios. In the area of AI research freedom 
of research is decisive as a legally binding human right, 
entailed in the rights of freedom of thought and freedom 
of expression that are laid down in the CCPR as an inter-
national universal human rights treaty. However, this 
freedom is not absolute: The protection – for instance – 
of life and health of human beings, of privacy and against 
discrimination are legitimate aims that can justify pro-
portional limitations of this right.112 The human rights 
framework, therefore, stresses that there exists a need to 
find proportional limitations in the field of AI research if 
there are dangers or risks113 for human life and health or 
107  In order to argue this way we have to answer the question what 
our criteria of rational acceptability are. My answer is based on 
the arguments by the philosopher Hilary Putnam that our criteria 
of rational acceptability are, inter alia, coherence, consistency, and 
relevance; that “fact (or truth) and rationality are interdependent 
notions” but that, nevertheless, no neutral understanding of ra-
tionality exists as the criteria of “rational acceptability rest on and 
presuppose our values”, and the “theory of truth presupposes the-
ory of rationality which in turn presupposes our theory of good”. 
Putnam concluded that the theory of the good is “itself dependent 
upon assumptions about human nature, about society, about the 
universe (including theological and metaphysical assumptions).” 
See Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, 1981, 198, 201, 
215.
108  This and the arguments at III.2. and 3. were published in my pa-
per Human Rights and Legitimate Governance of Existential and 
Global Catastrophic Risks, in Silja Voeneky/Gerald Neuman (eds.), 
Human Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in Times of Disorder, 
2018, 151 et seq.
109  In many cases, neither the risks nor the benefits of AI research and 
development can be quantified; the risk of misuse of AI systems by 
criminals, mentioned above, cannot be quantified; the unclear or 
unpredictable benefits of basic AI research cannot be quantified 
either – nevertheless, basic research may often be the necessary 
condition in order to achieve benefits for human beings in the long 
run. These are drawbacks of a utilitarian risk-benefit approach for 
some of the AI scenarios described above. For the lack of predic-
tability surrounding the consequences of AI, cf. Iyad Rahwan/Ma-
nuel Cebrian/Nick Obradovich et al., Machine behaviour, Nature 
568 (2019), 477. For a general discussion of the human rights ap-
proach versus utilitarianism see Herbert L. A. Hart, Between Uti-
lity and Rights, Colum. L. Rev. 79 (1979), 828. For a discussion of 
a combination of utilitarianism and other value based approaches 
(autonomy, diversity) and reference to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights for the codification of moral principles appli-
cable to future AI, see Max Tegmark, Life 3.0, 2017, 271–75.
110  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ad-
opted by G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 16.12.1966, entered into force 
23.03.1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, adopted by the Members of the Council of Europe, 
04.11.1950, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Con-
vention_ENG.pdf.
111  Art. 18 ICCPR, 19; art. 9, 10 ECHR. A different approach is taken, 
however, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, art. 13 (Freedom of the arts and sciences). There it is ex-
pressly laid down that “The arts and scientific research shall be 
free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.” Similar 
norms are included in national constitutions, see e.g. Grundgesetz 
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, art. 5 (3) (23.05.1949) which 
states that “Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. 
The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegi-
ance to the constitution.”
112  The legitimate aims for which the right of freedom of expression  
and the right of freedom of science can be limited according to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights are even broader. See art. 19 
(3) ICCPR, art. 10 (2) ECHR.
113  Risk can be defined as a risk is an “unwanted event which may 
or may not occur”, see Sven O. Hansson, Risk, in Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk/. There is no accepted definition 
of the term in public international law; it is unclear how—and 
whether—a “risk” is different from a “threat,” a “danger” and a 
“hazard,” see Grant Wilson, Minimizing Global Catastrophic and 
Existential Risks from Emerging Technologies through Internatio-
nal Law, Virginia Environmental L.J. 31 (2013), 307, 310.
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privacy. What limits to the freedom of research are justi-
fied depends on the probability of the realization of a 
risk114 and the severity of the possible harm.
Therefore, demands of rational risk-benefit assess-
ment can and should be part of the interpretation of hu-
man rights, as there is the need to avoid disproportiona-
te means in order to minimize risks even in low/unk-
nown probability cases: What proportionality means is 
linked to the risks and benefits one can reasonably anti-
cipate in the area of AI. To do a risk-benefit assessment 
of the AI system in question, as far as this is possible and 
rational, therefore is an important element in implemen-
ting the human rights framework.
Besides, even so-called first generation human rights, 
as laid down in the CCPR, oblige States not only to res-
pect, but also to protect the fundamental rights of indivi-
duals.115 They state that States parties are obliged by in-
ternational human rights treaties to take appropriate (le-
gal) measures to protect inter alia the life and health of 
individuals.116 And although there is wide discretion for 
States to protect human rights, measures must not be 
ineffective.
Last but not least, a human rights-based approach re-
quires procedural rights for individuals to participate in 
the making of decisions that affect them in the area of 
AI-developments. To rely on human rights mean that we 
have to spell out in more detail, how to enhance proce-
dural legitimacy.
These arguments might show that the core of the re-
gulation and governance problem – that AI systems 
should serve us as human beings and not the other way 
around – can be expressed best on the basis of a human 
rights framework. It is correct that human rights law, 
even the right to life, is not aiming to protect humanity, 
but aiming to protect individuals.117 However, humanity 
consists of us as individuals. Even if we are not arguing 
that human rights protect future generations, we may 
not neglect that individuals born today can have a life ex-
pectancy of more than 70 years in many States, and the-
se individuals are protected by human rights law. Hence, 
it seems consistent with the object and purpose of hu-
man rights treaties that we view human rights law, and 
the duty of States towards human beings because of hu-
man rights, in a 70 year period.
IV. Future AI Regulation
In this paper, I spell out what the deficiencies of current 
AI regulations (including international soft law) are 
(part I and II), and I argue why international law, and 
international human rights are and should be the basis 
for a legitimate global AI regulation and risk reduction 
regime (part III). This approach makes it possible to 
develop rules with regard to AI systems in coherence 
with relevant and morally justified values of a humane 
world order that is aiming for future scientific and tech-
nological advances in a responsible manner, including 
the human right to life, the right to non-discrimination, 
the right to privacy and the right to freedom of science.
However, this is only a first step as current human 
rights norms and treaties are a basis and a starting point. 
Therefore there is the need – as a second step – to specify 
the general human rights by negotiating a human rights-
based UN or UNESCO soft law declaration on “AI Eth-
ics and Human Rights”. This new declaration could and 
should avoid the disadvantages of the 2019 OECD AI re-
114  AI-governance means in many cases the governance of risks, as 
many impacts of AI are unclear and it is even unclear whether the-
re will be something like AGI or a singularity, see above note 42. 
But human rights can be used as a basis for human-centered risk 
governance. It was Robert Nozick who showed that an extension of 
a rights-based moral theory to indeterministic cases is possible as 
a duty not to harm other people can be extended to a duty not to 
perform actions that increase their risk of being harmed. See Silja 
Voeneky, Human Rights and Legitimate Governance of Existential 
and Global Catastrophic Risks, in Silja Voeneky/Gerald Neuman 
(eds.), Human Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in Times of 
Disorder, 2018, 153.
115  It is an obligation to protect, not only an obligation to respect; see 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/69, 29.04.2005, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17; Committee on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 13, para. 46 
(1999), reprinted in U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, 72 (2008).
116  For the right to life, art. 6 (1) ICCPR, the second sentence provides 
that the right to life “shall be protected by law.” In addition, the 
right to life is the precondition for the exercise of any other hu-
man right, part of customary international law and enshrined in 
all major general human rights conventions. The European Court 
of Human Rights has stressed the positive obligation to protect 
human life in several decisions; for an overview see Niels Petersen, 
Life, Right to, International Protection, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012, Vol. 
6, 866. Nevertheless, the U.S. has not accepted that there exists a 
duty to protect against private interference due to art. 6 ICCPR; 
see Observations of the United States of America On the Human 
Rights Committee’s Draft General Comment No. 36, On Article 6 
– Right to Life, para. 30–38 (06.10.2017), available at: http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36-Article6Righttolife.
aspx.
117  An exception – as part of a soft law declaration – is art. 2 (b) of the 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 05.08.1990, adop-
ted by Organization of the Islamic Conference Res. No. 49/19-P 
(1990).
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commendations. For this, we should identify those areas 
of AI-research, -development, and -deployment, which 
entail severe risks for core human rights.118 A future uni-
versal “AI Ethics and Human Rights”119 declaration 
should include sector-specific rules based on human 
rights that protect the most vulnerable rights and human 
dignity at the international level – as for instance, by pro-
tecting brain data. And this declaration could and should 
merge principles of “AI ethics”,120 as the pinciples of fair-
ness, accountability, explainability and transparency,121 
with human rights as long as principles of AI ethics are 
coherent with and specify human rights in the field of 
AI.122
Silja Vöneky ist Professorin an der Albert-Ludwigs-Univer-
sität Freiburg und Direktorin des Lehrstuhls für Völker-
recht, Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsethik sowie Fellow 
am FRIAS Saltus Gruppe Responsible AI.
118  I rely on those human rights that are part of the human rights 
treaties; whether there is the need for new human rights in the 
time of AI, as for a right of digital autonomy (digitale Selbstbe-
stimmung) as the German Datenethikkommission (cf. Gutachten 
der Datenethikkommission, 2019, available at: https://www.bmjv.
de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Fokusthemen/Gutach-
ten_DEK_DE.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5) argues or whe-
ther a new human right, that could be claimed by corporations, 
will undermine basic human rights of natural persons is still open 
to discussion.
119  Similar to the UNESCO Declaration on „Bioethics and Human 
Rights“, 19.10.2005, available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/
ev.php-URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SEC-
TION=201.html .
120  As was shown in Part II at least some of the principles are already 
part of AI sector-specific regula-tion.
121  For the notion of and the need for transparency see Gutachten der 
Datenethikkommission, 2019, 169 et seq., 175, 185, 215 (Transpa-
renz, Erklärbarkeit und Nachvollziehbarkeit).
122  Besides, there is the urgent need with regard to risks related to AI 
systems to have proactive pre-ventive regulation in place, which is 
backed by meaningful rules for operator incentives to reduce risks 
beyond pure operator liability; for a proposal see a paper by Thors-
ten Schmidt/Silja Vöneky on “How to regulate disruptive technolo-
gies?” (forthcoming 2020).
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